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Carter on Crisis of Confidence

Carter on Crisis of Confidence



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On July 15, 1979, with gasoline prices skyrocketing, President Jimmy Carter delivers his fifth speech on the energy crisis since taking office. He seeks to make an impact by focusing not just on the energy problem but also on the "crisis of confidence" facing Americans.


Jimmy Carter and the Meaning of Malaise

In July of 1979, Jimmy Carter delivered a presidential address that was more like a sermon, urging America to reflect upon its meaning and purpose.

In July of 1979, President Jimmy Carter faced seemingly intractable problems. Inflation was at 13 percent. Gasoline lines caused Americans to wait to fill up their cars on alternating days. The U.S. space station Skylab was about to fall from the sky, and no one could tell for sure where it might land. The president’s popularity rating was at 25 percent, lower than any since Harry Truman, and a majority of his party looked forward to nominating Senator Edward Kennedy in 1980.

Carter had planned a major energy speech to be given the week of Independence Day. He canceled it, creating a greater sense of anticipation. Then for the next ten days, he remained at Camp David in the Maryland mountains where he hosted an array of leaders in business, economics, religion, and politics, and solicited advice on what he should do next.

On July 15th, Carter came down from the mountains and gave what came to be known as the “Malaise Speech,” even though he never used the word in his televised address to the nation. Surprising viewers, who were expecting a laundry list of proposals to deal with the energy crisis, Carter took a different tack.

Most presidential addresses proclaim the greatness of Americans as citizens of a unique nation poised for further greatness. Instead, Carter proclaimed that the nation was suffering a “crisis in confidence” which struck “at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will.” He called upon the nation to reflect upon its meaning and purpose, and critiqued American materialism.

The immediate response was generally favorable. “No president since Abraham Lincoln had spoken to the American people with such sincerity about matters of the spirit,” gushed presidential historian Theodore White. Polls indicated that 61 percent of the public said the speech inspired further confidence. Seventy-two percent said they were willing to sacrifice to help solve the energy crisis, which had been Carter’s major policy plea. The president’s approval ratings went up twelve points.

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As scholar Robert A. Strong notes, the speech was more sermon than policy prescription. The structure was similar to southern church revivals familiar to Carter, a devout Southern Baptist. There was an acknowledgement of sins, as Carter acknowledged his failings a reaffirmation of faith in the American spirit, and a rededication to action through a series of energy proposals Carter planned to send to Congress.

According to Strong, the speech itself was largely a success. But it was soon overshadowed by other factors.

Carter reshuffled his Cabinet within days, changing the focus on his call to American sacrifice. Soon his administration would be absorbed in foreign policy crises as the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan dominated the headlines. Carter proved unable to overcome these obstacles and lost his re-election bid to Ronald Reagan, who projected a more sunny view of the American experience. Pundits would later criticize Carter’s “malaise” speech, arguing that he was blaming the public for his own failings.

According to Strong, Carter’s disappointments overshadowed his legacy, including accomplishments such as the Panama Canal treaty and the Camp David Accords that established a long-term peace between Egypt and Israel. The later setbacks, he noted, put the speech in a different light. But in its own time, the speech was considered both highly unusual and largely successful.


A squandered opportunity

This articulation of economic and political humility sounded the perfect pitch for a nation whose confidence in civil institutions had been shaken. The Watergate scandal had revealed corruption in the nation’s highest political offices. The Vietnam War had ended with a Communist victory.

The “malaise speech” was a continuation of a long-running theme for Carter. In his 1977 inaugural address, he intoned, “We have learned that ‘more’ is not necessarily ‘better,’ that even our great nation has its recognized limits, and that we can neither answer all questions nor solve all problems … we must simply do our best.”

Popular memory suggests that the nation reacted negatively to his speech. In The Age of Reagan, historian Sean Wilentz writes that Carter appeared to be blaming the American citizens for their problems. Others panned Carter’s idealistic approach to the energy crisis as naïve.

Soon after the speech, Carter got a bump in his approval ratings. AP Photo/Harry Cabluck

But that was not how most Americans received the speech. In fact, Carter enjoyed an immediate 11 percent bump in his job approval rating in the days that followed. Clearly many agreed with Carter’s line that the nation was mired in a “moral and spiritual crisis.”

The President, however, failed to capitalize on the resonance with his meditation. Just two days after his speech, Carter fired his entire cabinet, which seemed to suggest that his government was in disarray.

The President’s poll numbers immediately melted. As Time magazine described it, “The President basked in the applause for a day and then set in motion his astounding purge, undoing much of the good he had done himself.” Reagan soon capitalized on the disillusionment. “I find no national malaise,” said Carter’s successor, who campaigned on a platform of America as “a shining city on a hill.

About to win the Cold War, America was ready for some exuberant nationalism, not a plain-style president who insisted on carrying his own garment bag aboard Air Force One.


Jimmy Carter and the American Collapse of Confidence

“I want to talk to you right now about a fundamental threat to American democracy. I do not mean our political and civil liberties. They will endure. And I do not refer to the outward strength of America, a nation that is at peace tonight everywhere in the world, with unmatched economic power and military might. The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence.” —President James Earl Carter, “Malaise speech,” July 15, 1979

In the summer of 1976, James Earl Carter accepted the Democratic Party’s nomination for president of the United States. Three years into his presidency, as the nation reeled under the post-Nixon energy crisis, President Carter delivered a speech to address what he identified as “a crisis of confidence”—a nationwide malaise (a term Carter did not use in the speech) resulting from the aftershock of the murders of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr., and the experiences of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal.

Though his speech was primarily directed at concerns about energy conservation, the malaise that Carter described afflicting the American people has deepened over the last four decades into a great and grim shadow. With this summer’s political conventions, what Jimmy Carter said on national television thirty-seven years ago echoes prophetically, as the United States endures what has become not just a crisis, but indeed a collapse, of confidence.

“The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America,” spoke President Carter in 1979. “It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.” The crisis of erosion has not ceased in 2016. Consider the following words from President Carter’s speech arranged as a list of what Americans are experiencing today:

The symptoms of this crisis of the American spirit are all around us:

  • For the first time in the history of our country a majority of our people believe that the next five years will be worse than the past five years.
  • Two-thirds of our people do not even vote.
  • The productivity of American workers is actually dropping, and the willingness of Americans to save for the future has fallen below that of all other people in the Western world.
  • There is a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions.

As Carter concluded, “This is not a message of happiness or reassurance, but it is the truth and it is a warning.” We should take heed of the warning and the truth. Any lack of confidence finds its source in a lack of competence. With all the agents of incompetence that have gained influence and power in the echelons of society, it is little wonder that the crisis of confidence identified by Carter has endured through good presidents and bad, only to secure renewed prominence.

President Carter’s response to the unrest in America caused by assassination, war, political scandal, economic turbulence, gas shortages, and a swelling national debt were to promote austerity measures among the citizenry, cut government budgets (though he actually increased the defense budget after his second year in office), bargain with enemies, and make humility the new American brand. These policies largely resulted in a weakening of optimism among Americans and the renewed boldness of America’s enemies across the globe—most notably in Iran.

It is all eerily familiar under Barack Obama, whose administration is, in certain respects, a repetition of the Carter Administration. Once again, there is a great emphasis on international treaties and foreign deals, a perceived weakening of the American national defense posture, and an American brand that has gone from retiring to repentant. Again, there is political upheaval, war, economic and social havoc, an incomprehensible national debt, and an American people that are anything but confident. Unlike Carter, though, Obama has glossed over the insecurities he has fostered with a bizarre bravado, as he conjures up the ghosts of fear and turns the nation’s meekness into weakness. The foes of America preen, while Americans cower, bereft of confidence due to an incompetent president, an inept Congress, and an insurgent culture, leaving the nation with no foundation on which to withstand the tremors of terrorism and turmoil.

So much for Hope and Change.

At the Republican and Democratic conventions, two of the most unsavory candidates in American political history—Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton—accepted their party’s presidential nominations. The overwhelming and outspoken distaste and distress over these nominees alone signals a national vote of no-confidence. These two candidates are the Scylla and Charybdis of the American voyage and, to many Americans, there is no alternative but shipwreck. Without confidence, there is no shortage of confusion nowadays. The chaos, raging and ranging from gay “marriage” to transgender bathroom bills to racial tensions in law enforcement to fortified abortion laws, is a force that has rendered unity of purpose a thing long lost. There is little confidence in the qualifications of billionaire mogul Donald Trump to calm a troubled nation. There is little confidence in the trustworthiness of short-circuiting Hillary Clinton to free the country from corruption, as she plots President Obama’s third term.

The crisis of confidence is past. The collapse is come. Confidence in the future of the country is clearly plummeting, and without confidence there can be no real progress in “making America great again.” As French philosopher Joseph de Maistre said, “Every country has the government it deserves.”

In the all-too-applicable words of Carter:

Confidence in the future has supported everything else—public institutions and private enterprise, our own families, and the very Constitution of the United States. Confidence has defined our course and has served as a link between generations. We’ve always believed in something called progress. We’ve always had a faith that the days of our children would be better than our own. Our people are losing that faith, not only in government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy.

That faith is lost. It will take more than building a wall to rebuild a fallen nation. It will take more than a ban on Muslims entering the United States to restore the confidence of a crestfallen country. There can be no confidence in comatose lethargy, contentious communities, concentrated materialism, or collective atheism. In days like these when Teddy Roosevelt’s big stick has been whittled down to a cheerleader baton, the only real confidence arises from clinging to the bulwark that will never fail. The destiny of America, like any great civilization, is collapse—and its rumblings are in the air—but there is one institution on earth whose destiny is eternity because it is not earthly: the Christian Church (and in this writer’s view, the Catholic Church). In Her is the first and last source of confidence. Faith has the greatest potential to thrive when there is little else in which to believe. Hope can never be as strong as in a hopeless situation.

The warning still sounds. The truth still awaits. The challenge still exists—even though it is a greater challenge. Faith in the Church and the country must re-enkindle and gain strength if confidence is to return. In the meantime, cultural devastation and demoralization looms. Political skepticism is rampant. The challenge for this American generation is similar to what it was in 1979—to revive the American spirit. In God we trust.

The Imaginative Conservative applies the principle of appreciation to the discussion of culture and politics—we approach dialogue with magnanimity rather than with mere civility. Will you help us remain a refreshing oasis in the increasingly contentious arena of modern discourse? Please consider donating now.

The featured image (detail) is in the public domain, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

All comments are moderated and must be civil, concise, and constructive to the conversation. Comments that are critical of an essay may be approved, but comments containing ad hominem criticism of the author will not be published. Also, comments containing web links or block quotations are unlikely to be approved. Keep in mind that essays represent the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Imaginative Conservative or its editor or publisher.


In his speech, President Jimmy Carter addresses many issues facing the U.S. but focuses on what he believes to be the biggest crisis – the crisis of confidence. By using terms that appeal to the patriotism of the American people, addressing his and the government’s faults and presenting his ideas and views in a way that is logical and understandable, he is quite persuasive in bringing across his message.

Carter begins by first acknowledging himself and the promises he’d made and reiterates them. By doing this, he is indirectly giving reassurance to the general public by letting them know that he remembers his promises. He makes a consistent point to talk about togetherness and patriotism, both of which are ideas that appeal to the public, especially in light of the Vietnam War. He talks directly to the people, and by doing that, he personalizes his speech. He also talks about close-knit communities, family, church, and condemns consumption. He puts emotionally appealing aspects of American life at the forefront so that people are more likely to understand, respect, but most importantly, resonate with him.

The use of terms such as “loss of unity and purpose” also play in Carter’s favor as they invoke feelings of urgency, causing people to think about the way they are leading their lives. He further uses facts to enhance this urgency by stating that 2/3 of the country’s population don’t even vote.

Carter also makes a point to list the accomplishments of the generation and government, such as the movement towards equality with MLK, landing on the moon, etc. In all this, he constantly builds up his own credibility by talking about how he proposed ideas to Congress to benefit the country and how he made certain attempts “for the 5th time”.

Carter utilizes emotional and logical arguments and implicitly builds up his own credibility throughout his speech, even just by the way he looks at the camera, which all contribute to him giving a successfully persuasive speech.


Jimmy Carter and the American Collapse of Confidence

“I want to talk to you right now about a fundamental threat to American democracy. I do not mean our political and civil liberties. They will endure. And I do not refer to the outward strength of America, a nation that is at peace tonight everywhere in the world, with unmatched economic power and military might. The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence.” —President James Earl Carter, “Malaise speech,” July 15, 1979

In the summer of 1976, James Earl Carter accepted the Democratic Party’s nomination for president of the United States. Three years into his presidency, as the nation reeled under the post-Nixon energy crisis, President Carter delivered a speech to address what he identified as “a crisis of confidence”—a nationwide malaise (a term Carter did not use in the speech) resulting from the aftershock of the murders of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr., and the experiences of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal.

Though his speech was primarily directed at concerns about energy conservation, the malaise that Carter described afflicting the American people has deepened over the last four decades into a great and grim shadow. With this summer’s political conventions, what Jimmy Carter said on national television thirty-seven years ago echoes prophetically, as the United States endures what has become not just a crisis, but indeed a collapse, of confidence.

“The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America,” spoke President Carter in 1979. “It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.” The crisis of erosion has not ceased in 2016. Consider the following words from President Carter’s speech arranged as a list of what Americans are experiencing today:

The symptoms of this crisis of the American spirit are all around us:

  • For the first time in the history of our country a majority of our people believe that the next five years will be worse than the past five years.
  • Two-thirds of our people do not even vote.
  • The productivity of American workers is actually dropping, and the willingness of Americans to save for the future has fallen below that of all other people in the Western world.
  • There is a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions.

As Carter concluded, “This is not a message of happiness or reassurance, but it is the truth and it is a warning.” We should take heed of the warning and the truth. Any lack of confidence finds its source in a lack of competence. With all the agents of incompetence that have gained influence and power in the echelons of society, it is little wonder that the crisis of confidence identified by Carter has endured through good presidents and bad, only to secure renewed prominence.

President Carter’s response to the unrest in America caused by assassination, war, political scandal, economic turbulence, gas shortages, and a swelling national debt were to promote austerity measures among the citizenry, cut government budgets (though he actually increased the defense budget after his second year in office), bargain with enemies, and make humility the new American brand. These policies largely resulted in a weakening of optimism among Americans and the renewed boldness of America’s enemies across the globe—most notably in Iran.

It is all eerily familiar under Barack Obama, whose administration is, in certain respects, a repetition of the Carter Administration. Once again, there is a great emphasis on international treaties and foreign deals, a perceived weakening of the American national defense posture, and an American brand that has gone from retiring to repentant. Again, there is political upheaval, war, economic and social havoc, an incomprehensible national debt, and an American people that are anything but confident. Unlike Carter, though, Obama has glossed over the insecurities he has fostered with a bizarre bravado, as he conjures up the ghosts of fear and turns the nation’s meekness into weakness. The foes of America preen, while Americans cower, bereft of confidence due to an incompetent president, an inept Congress, and an insurgent culture, leaving the nation with no foundation on which to withstand the tremors of terrorism and turmoil.

So much for Hope and Change.

At the Republican and Democratic conventions, two of the most unsavory candidates in American political history—Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton—accepted their party’s presidential nominations. The overwhelming and outspoken distaste and distress over these nominees alone signals a national vote of no-confidence. These two candidates are the Scylla and Charybdis of the American voyage and, to many Americans, there is no alternative but shipwreck. Without confidence, there is no shortage of confusion nowadays. The chaos, raging and ranging from gay “marriage” to transgender bathroom bills to racial tensions in law enforcement to fortified abortion laws, is a force that has rendered unity of purpose a thing long lost. There is little confidence in the qualifications of billionaire mogul Donald Trump to calm a troubled nation. There is little confidence in the trustworthiness of short-circuiting Hillary Clinton to free the country from corruption, as she plots President Obama’s third term.

The crisis of confidence is past. The collapse is come. Confidence in the future of the country is clearly plummeting, and without confidence there can be no real progress in “making America great again.” As French philosopher Joseph de Maistre said, “Every country has the government it deserves.”

In the all-too-applicable words of Carter:

Confidence in the future has supported everything else—public institutions and private enterprise, our own families, and the very Constitution of the United States. Confidence has defined our course and has served as a link between generations. We’ve always believed in something called progress. We’ve always had a faith that the days of our children would be better than our own. Our people are losing that faith, not only in government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy.

That faith is lost. It will take more than building a wall to rebuild a fallen nation. It will take more than a ban on Muslims entering the United States to restore the confidence of a crestfallen country. There can be no confidence in comatose lethargy, contentious communities, concentrated materialism, or collective atheism. In days like these when Teddy Roosevelt’s big stick has been whittled down to a cheerleader baton, the only real confidence arises from clinging to the bulwark that will never fail. The destiny of America, like any great civilization, is collapse—and its rumblings are in the air—but there is one institution on earth whose destiny is eternity because it is not earthly: the Christian Church (and in this writer’s view, the Catholic Church). In Her is the first and last source of confidence. Faith has the greatest potential to thrive when there is little else in which to believe. Hope can never be as strong as in a hopeless situation.

The warning still sounds. The truth still awaits. The challenge still exists—even though it is a greater challenge. Faith in the Church and the country must re-enkindle and gain strength if confidence is to return. In the meantime, cultural devastation and demoralization looms. Political skepticism is rampant. The challenge for this American generation is similar to what it was in 1979—to revive the American spirit. In God we trust.

The Imaginative Conservative applies the principle of appreciation to the discussion of culture and politics—we approach dialogue with magnanimity rather than with mere civility. Will you help us remain a refreshing oasis in the increasingly contentious arena of modern discourse? Please consider donating now.

The featured image (detail) is in the public domain, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

All comments are moderated and must be civil, concise, and constructive to the conversation. Comments that are critical of an essay may be approved, but comments containing ad hominem criticism of the author will not be published. Also, comments containing web links or block quotations are unlikely to be approved. Keep in mind that essays represent the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Imaginative Conservative or its editor or publisher.


Was it the greatest speech of his presidency or political suicide?

Three decades on, the answer may well be both.

Thirty years ago Wednesday, President Jimmy Carter delivered a speech — “The Crisis of Confidence” — that became one of the most pilloried in modern American history.

It was an address in which he looked critically at himself and his own failures but also warned Americans in dire, near-apocalyptic terms about the potential consequences of theirs.

“The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America,” preached the president, a devout evangelical Christian who saw in Americans a crisis of faith not in God but in the nation — and in themselves.

Delivered against a background of inflation, rising oil prices and gas lines, the address was derisively dubbed the “malaise” speech by the press. And when Carter requested resignations from his entire Cabinet a few days later, the speech became all the proof anyone needed that he was blaming Americans for his own mistakes.

What few recall is the speech’s actual content — which still resonates strongly in the current economic crisis— or the fact that it was actually well-received by the public at the time.

“It was an incredibly successful speech, until he fired the Cabinet, which changed the whole tenor of things,” said Patrick Caddell, who was the president’s pollster and a chief architect of the speech.

“It got a great reception. I’ve never felt more that American political journalism bordered on Soviet history-making than on that speech,” he said. “From the misnaming of it, to the trying to say later that it was unpopular — the historical revisionism. The speech itself was an extraordinary success.”

Kevin Mattson, author of “‘What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?’: Jimmy Carter, America’s ‘Malaise,’ and the Speech That Should Have Changed the Country,” agrees.

“It’s clear that the speech was a success on its own grounds,” he says. Carter “had an incredible bump in the polls. The mail that he was receiving at the White House was overwhelmingly positive, and a lot of it was people saying they were going to cut down on their consumption of gas and cut out unnecessary trips.” At least initially, he says, “a lot of it resonated.”

“I do think people were ready to follow in those first days after the speech,” says The New Yorker’s Hendrik Hertzberg, who was the lead speechwriter on the address. “And then there was the Cabinet Jonestown, and I think that’s where the elites turned definitively against Carter, and that trickled down before too long to everybody else.”

Even Stuart E. Eizenstat, Carter’s chief domestic adviser, who joined Vice President Walter Mondale in fighting the idea of the speech, now agrees that it was well-received.

“Mondale and I were arguing that the ‘crisis in confidence’ was not among the American people, that it was in our own leadership and that we had to be careful not to appear to be pointing the finger at them rather than at us,” Eizenstat remembers. He says that a meeting on an early draft was “as vigorous and rhetorically violent as any I’ve ever been in,” he recalls. “It was a very large conference table, and if it hadn’t been, I think that Mondale might have leaned across and choked Caddell.”

Still, he acknowledges, “contrary to my argument, the speech was actually a brilliant success,” with Carter’s polling shooting up “10 or 11 points” afterward. It was, Eizenstat says, “like the old magic had come back from the ’76 campaign.”

Then, within days, the Cabinet firings “undercut any sense that this was a new start to the administration, that he had sort of learned his lesson and was starting afresh. It just totally stepped on the headlines of the speech.”

Caddell notes that even the press responded well to the speech at first — he particularly recalls a Newsweek cover story on the address titled “To Lift a Nation’s Spirit.”

Thomas M. DeFrank, Washington bureau chief for the New York Daily News, who contributed to that Newsweek story, says that in the immediate aftermath of the speech, there was a sense that “it was going to kind of go either way — but it went south, not north.”

“Wholesale sacking of Cabinet officers usually comes off as desperation,” he says, “and I think that, plus the speech, it all contributed to the notion of Carter as a floundering leader. I think from that time on, the feeling was that Carter was on borrowed time.”

Today, however, parts of the speech itself seem downright prescient.

Says Hertzberg: “Certainly it was prophetic. I think that there’s no question of its value as prophecy. And as exhortation.”

He adds: “When I say he was a prophet, there was a little bit of a barb in that he was a kind of John the Baptist figure, crying in the wilderness. You could say that he’s a prophet of what’s come to fruition by Obama.”

Carter, for example, saw a major overhaul of the country’s energy policy as an opportunity to re-envision the nation’s future — a presaging of Obama’s current commitment to a similar goal — though today some of Carter’s policy prescriptions sound more like those advocated by Republicans. (He stressed shifting from imported oil to home-grown natural resources such as coal, oil shale and “gasohol,” for example.)

The Georgia peanut farmer also expressed a deep concern about excessive materialism in the speech: “In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption,” he warned. “Human identity is no longer defined by what one does but by what one owns.”

Julian Zelizer, a professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University, notes that these same tendencies are at the heart of many of our problems today — “not just energy, but if you look at something like the mortgage crisis, as well, at the heart of it is our consumer patterns, our thirst for consumer goods, our inability to think through what we purchase, and our tendency to judge our value by what we own,” he says.

Some of the rhetoric also sounds strangely familiar. For example, Carter railed against our “intolerable dependence on foreign oil” and argued for a return to “energy independence.” He put his faith in America’s “skilled work force” and “innovative genius,” linking the effort required to win the “war on the energy problem” to the moon landing and noting that those listening to his words are “the heirs of generations who survived threats much more powerful and awesome than those that challenge us now.”

But he was also clear: “I do not promise you that this struggle for freedom will be easy. I do not promise a quick way out of our nation’s problems, when the truth is that the only way out is an all-out effort.”

Robert Collins, a professor of history at the University of Missouri-Columbia who has written a book on the Reagan era and is working on one on the energy crisis, says that the speech’s major flaw wasn’t Carter’s diagnosis or his prescription but his tone.

“It seems to me that the speech was in some ways a rather accurate depiction of the mood of the country and some of the problems that the administration was facing, but I’ve always believed that it could be argued that the 1980s actually began with the malaise speech,” he says. “It seemed to me that his observations were not at all inaccurate but that he managed to put the most pessimistic possible spin on what he was seeing and trying to communicate to the American public.”

Indeed, the term “malaise” also quickly became a sort of shorthand for the president’s pessimism and a rallying cry for Carter’s opponents, most particularly Ronald Reagan, whose sunny outlook stood in stark relief.

Of the speech, Edwin Meese III, who served as Reagan’s attorney general, says: “It seemed to cast blame on the American people, that somehow they were wrong. It seemed to ignore the fact that the federal government was not doing much to solve the problems. It was just kind of a defeatist speech.”

By contrast, he notes, “one of the most significant characteristics about Ronald Reagan was, in fact, his optimism.”

“It absolutely played into Reagan’s theme there was nothing wrong with America that a change of leadership couldn’t fix,” says DeFrank. “The malaise speech became one of Ronald Reagan’s most effective talking points.”

In his election-eve speech in 1980, Reagan said, “I find no national malaise, I find nothing wrong with the American people. Oh, they are frustrated, even angry at what has been done to this blessed land. But more than anything, they are sturdy and robust, as they have always been.”

Says Mattson of Carter: “My sense was that it was kind of a tragic situation. He really did hit upon something, opened this window — and then managed to foul it up.”


Excerpt: "What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?"

"What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?": Jimmy Carter, America's "Malaise," and the Speech that Should Have Changed the CountryBy Kevin MattsonHardcover, 272 pagesBloomsbury USAList Price: $25

July 4, Independence Day, 1979: Rain fell like sheets on Washington, D.C., and suspense mounted. Would the nation's biggest fireworks show proceed or be drowned? National Park officials huddled in rickety wood structures roped with plastic and decided around 3pm to make an announcement: Please be patient. Then at 5pm, they announced an official delay. Four hours later, they cancelled the show altogether.

Close-by, a different celebration got underway: The annual "smoke-in" of the Youth International Party (Yippies), an organization founded twelve years ago by counterculture celebrities Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin. There was no Vietnam War to protest in 1979, of course, but the right to get high seemed as urgent as stopping a war. In Lafayette Park, across from the White House, scraggly young adults toked joints, swigged bottles of Jack Daniels, and set off firecrackers. The rain turned the tangy smell of pot slightly mellower, but when the high wore off, the crowd went berserk. The mob scrambled over a large black fence onto the White House lawn. Cops pursued, dodging beer bottles flung at them. Nine arrests followed, one just a few feet away from the White House.

Perhaps it was fortunate fewer people were on the Mall to be disappointed by cancelled fireworks or freaked out by police-hippy melees. Most gas stations in D.C. were shut down, not for the July 4th holiday but as a result of the decision by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut exports to the United States. Stations with gas reported mile-long lines and three-hour waits. This was becoming a summer when people coasted or pushed their cars to stations to find no gas. Most D.C. residents simply stayed home on July 4. Those who did search for gas raged. "The greatest country in the world," one person on a gas line told an inquiring journalist, "is stifled by a few shieks."

An editorial in the Los Angeles Times on July 4 stated the obvious: "This Independence Day, the holiday's very name seems to mock us." The grand old document known as the Declaration of Independence trumpeted citizens' rights to "alter" or "abolish" governments in face of a hostile world. Now this. Americans couldn't even get the third world to cough up enough gas to roll their cars out of driveways for traditional summer vacations. Stoned teenagers took over the White House lawn. Freedom seemed a cruel joke or an excuse for chaos. The conservative tabloid, the New York Post, intoned that on "Independence Day, 1979 the American paradox is bleakly apparent. As a nation, we appear to have become steadily more dependent on forces seemingly beyond our control, losing confidence in our ability to master events, uncertain of our direction." And then the editors slipped in this zinger: "The United States is now a victim of a loss of nerve and will, wracked by indecision and groping for a glimpse of inspirational and innovative leadership."

It didn't take much to figure out that the New York Post's editors intended those words for Jimmy Carter, the thirty-ninth president of the United States. Carter wasn't in the White House the day Yippies jumped the fence. He was at Camp David in the Catoctin Mountains of rural Maryland, the place where just a year ago he initiated the grandest accomplishment of his presidency, a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, after long, tiresome meetings and brutal negotiations. Since then, Camp David provided good memories and a refuge from the strains of an increasingly strainful presidency, a place to fish, read, and relax. But on July 4, Carter felt the bad mood setting in on the nation and himself.

Before he had helicoptered to Camp David on July 3, key members of his staff – Gerald (Jerry) Rafshoon, a man whose background in advertising helped him work on improving the president's image Hamilton (Ham) Jordan, the president's loyal right hand man and soon-to-be Chief of Staff Jody Powell, the press secretary and Stuart Eizenstat, a policy wonk and chief domestic advisor at the White House – hounded Carter to make a speech about the energy crisis, about those long gas lines exploding with anger. This group, most often called the "Georgia Mafia" since they followed Carter from the governor's mansion of Georgia to the White House, applied pressure.

The member of the mafia that Carter trusted most, Ham Jordan, had been watching over the White House while Carter had bounced around the world on a series of diplomatic trips recently. During the president's June sojourns to Austria, Japan, and Korea, Jordan would sometimes kick back and watch television news. He saw repeated images of gas lines tinged with violence and interviews with angry citizens: "What in the hell is Carter doing in Japan and Korea when all the problems are here at home?" Don't wait, Jordan counseled the president, to calm these people's nerves. Citizens "want to hear from their President." So Jordan applied pressure the best way he knew how: He summoned Jerry Rafshoon to get Hendrik Hertzberg and Gordon Stewart, chief speechwriters at the time, to work up a speech. "With a very heavy heart," they sent a speech to Camp David. They knew it was bland, dry, and not up to the crisis Americans faced.

Pressure, such as it was, never made Carter nervous. Just the opposite. He had a phenomenal ability to grow calmer while others went bonkers. Rafshoon would pace and pull on his curly locks, Jordan would boil, Eizenstat would blurt out criticisms, and Powell would smoke cigarette after cigarette. Carter just flashed a steely grin. The political commentator and historian Garry Wills once described Carter's "ferocious tenderness, the detached intimacy, the cooing which nonetheless suggests a proximity of lions." But one thing always wound up driving the president crazy: His need to rely on others to perform tasks that produced mixed results.

The drafted speech he stared at was a case in point. He could barely make it past page four. For sure, it had its moments, talking of patriotism and American independence and the need to extol the key virtue of war – sacrifice for the common good – while battling dependency on OPEC oil. Those were ideas Carter could get behind. The speech also mentioned an incident where a pregnant woman was violently attacked in a Los Angeles gas line. That frightening story might send shivers up the spine of the public's conscience. But the rest of the speech read like a laundry list of vague energy plans. After falling asleep reading it, Carter went to bed. Later that night, First Lady Rosalynn Carter stumbled across it on a coffee table. Suffering jet-lag related insomnia (she had accompanied Jimmy overseas), Rosalynn read the speech and then told her husband the next morning it was awful. She had a much better ear than the president for the way a speech like this might play politically, and her judgment mattered immensely to Jimmy. That was it, Carter thought, there was to be no speech, at least not this one.

So while National Park officials and fireworks operators worried about rain and the citizens of the nation's capitol waited in gas lines or stayed home, Carter placed a call from Camp David to the White House. Vice President Walter Mondale joined Jordan, Powell, and Rafshoon on phones. Cancel it, the president's words hissed over telephone wires. Rafshoon flew into a panic. This had never happened before, never, not in the course of American history had a president canceled a speech with no explanation. Rafshoon complained that he had already called the television networks and asked them to block out the time. Calling them back wouldn't be easy. This is not the image we want to project, Rafshoon argued.

Carter rebuffed his image man. "There's more to it than energy," Carter explained. And then to underscore his point, as if the exhaustion and curtness in his voice weren't enough, he blurted out, "I just don't want to bullshit the American people." The advisors grew shocked at these words but continued to protest. So Carter hung up on them. Jody Powell looked at the others in the room with grief. He knew he'd have to make a statement the next day. The best he could come up with was short and perfunctory: There would be no speech, he announced, and then followed that with a "no further comment."

And then the president seemed to disappear.

Copyright 2009 by Kevin Mattson. Reprinted by permission of Bloomsbury USA.


Contents

Carter was elected as the Governor of Georgia in 1970, and during his four years in office he earned a reputation as a progressive, racially moderate Southern governor. Observing George McGovern's success in the 1972 Democratic primaries, Carter came to believe that he could win the 1976 Democratic presidential nomination by running as an outsider unconnected to establishment politicians in Washington, D.C. [1] Carter declared his candidacy for the 1976 Democratic presidential nomination in December 1974 and swore "to never lie to the American people.” [2] As Democratic leaders such as 1968 nominee Hubert Humphrey, Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota, and Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts declined to enter the race, there was no clear favorite in the Democratic primaries. Mo Udall, Sargent Shriver, Birch Bayh, Fred R. Harris, Terry Sanford, Henry M. Jackson, Lloyd Bentsen, and George Wallace all sought the nomination, and many of these candidates were better known than Carter. [3]

Carter sought to appeal to various groups in the party his advocacy for cutting defense spending and reining in the CIA appealed to liberals, while his emphasis on eliminating government waste appealed to conservatives. [4] Carter won the most votes of any candidate in the Iowa caucus, and he dominated media coverage in advance of the New Hampshire primary, which he also won. [5] Carter's subsequent defeat of Wallace in the Florida and North Carolina primaries eliminated Carter's main rival in the South. [6] With a victory over Jackson in the Pennsylvania primary, Carter established himself as the clear front-runner. [7] Despite the late entrance of Senator Frank Church and Governor Jerry Brown into the race, Carter clinched the nomination on the final day of the primaries. [8] The 1976 Democratic National Convention proceeded harmoniously and, after interviewing several candidates, Carter chose Mondale as his running mate. The selection of Mondale was well received by many liberal Democrats, many of whom had been skeptical of Carter. [9]

The Republicans experienced a contested convention that ultimately nominated incumbent President Gerald Ford, who had succeeded to the presidency in 1974 after the resignation of Richard Nixon due to the latter's involvement in the Watergate scandal. [9] With the Republicans badly divided, and with Ford facing questions over his competence as president, polls taken in August 1976 showed Carter with a 15-point lead. [10] In the general election campaign, Carter continued to promote a centrist agenda, seeking to define new Democratic positions in the aftermath of the tumultuous 1960s. Above all, Carter attacked the political system, defining himself as an "outsider" who would reform Washington in the post-Watergate era. [11] In response, Ford attacked Carter's supposed "fuzziness", arguing that Carter had taken vague stances on major issues. [10] Carter and President Ford faced off in three televised debates during the 1976 election, [12] the first such debates since 1960. [12] Ford was generally viewed as the winner of the first debate, but he made a major gaffe in the second debate when he stated there was "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe." [a] The gaffe put an end to Ford's late momentum, and Carter helped his own campaign with a strong performance in the third debate. Polls taken just before election day showed a very close race. [13]

Carter won the election with 50.1% of the popular vote and 297 electoral votes, while Ford won 48% of the popular vote and 240 electoral votes. The 1976 presidential election represents the lone Democratic presidential election victory between the elections of 1964 and 1992. Carter fared particularly well in the Northeast and the South, while Ford swept the West and won much of the Midwest. In the concurrent congressional elections, Democrats increased their majorities in both the House and Senate. [14]

Preliminary planning for Carter's presidential transition had already been underway for months before his election. [15] [16] Carter had been the first presidential candidate to allot significant funds and a significant number of personnel to a pre-election transition planning effort, which subsequently would become standard practice. [17] Carter would set a mold with his presidential transition that would influence all subsequent presidential transitions, taking a methodical approach to his transition, and having a larger and more formal operation than past presidential transitions had. [17] [16]

In his inaugural address, Carter said, "We have learned that more is not necessarily better, that even our great nation has its recognized limits, and that we can neither answer all questions nor solve all problems." [18] Carter had campaigned on a promise to eliminate the trappings of the "Imperial Presidency," and began taking action according to that promise on Inauguration Day, breaking with recent history and security protocols by walking from the Capitol to the White House in his inaugural parade. His first steps in the White House went further in this direction: Carter cut the size of the 500-member White House staff by one-third and reduced the perks for the president and cabinet members. [19] He also fulfilled a campaign promise by issuing a "full complete and unconditional pardon" (amnesty) for Vietnam War-era draft evaders. [20]

The Carter Cabinet
OfficeNameTerm
PresidentJimmy Carter1977–1981
Vice PresidentWalter Mondale1977–1981
Secretary of StateCyrus Vance1977–1980
Edmund Muskie1980–1981
Secretary of the TreasuryW. Michael Blumenthal1977–1979
G. William Miller1979–1981
Secretary of DefenseHarold Brown1977–1981
Attorney GeneralGriffin Bell1977–1979
Benjamin Civiletti1979–1981
Secretary of the InteriorCecil Andrus1977–1981
Secretary of AgricultureRobert Bergland1977–1981
Secretary of CommerceJuanita M. Kreps1977–1979
Philip Klutznick1979–1981
Secretary of LaborRay Marshall1977–1981
Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare
Joseph A. Califano Jr.1977–1979
Patricia Roberts Harris*1979–1980
Secretary of Health and
Human Services
Patricia Roberts Harris*1980–1981
Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development
Patricia Roberts Harris1977–1979
Maurice "Moon" Landrieu1979–1981
Secretary of TransportationBrock Adams1977–1979
Neil Goldschmidt1979–1981
Secretary of EnergyJames R. Schlesinger1977–1979
Charles Duncan Jr.1979–1981
Secretary of EducationShirley Hufstedler*1979–1981
Director of the Office of
Management and Budget
Bert Lance1977
James T. McIntyre1977–1981
United States Trade RepresentativeRobert S. Strauss1977–1979
Reubin Askew1979–1980
Ambassador to the United NationsAndrew Young1977–1979
Donald McHenry1979–1981
National Security AdvisorZbigniew Brzezinski1977–1981
Chair of the
Council of Economic Advisers
Charles Schultze1977–1981
*The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was renamed the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 1980, when its education
functions were transferred to the newly created Department of Education under
the Department of Education Organization Act (1979).

Though Carter had campaigned against Washington insiders, many of his top appointees had served in previous presidential administrations. [21] Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal had been high-ranking officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. [22] Other notable appointments included Charles Schultze as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger as a presidential assistant on energy issues, federal judge Griffin Bell as Attorney General, and Patricia Roberts Harris, the first African-American woman to serve in the cabinet, [23] as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. [24]

Carter appointed several close associates from Georgia to staff the Executive Office of the President. He initially offered the position of White House Chief of Staff to two of his advisers, Hamilton Jordan and Charles Kirbo, but both declined. Carter decided not to have a chief of staff, instead implementing a system in which cabinet members would have more direct access to the president. [25] Bert Lance was selected to lead the Office of Management and Budget, while Jordan became a key aide and adviser. Other appointees from Georgia included Jody Powell as White House Press Secretary, Jack Watson as cabinet secretary, and Stuart E. Eizenstat as head of the Domestic Policy Staff. [26] To oversee the administration's foreign policy, Carter relied on several members of the Trilateral Commission, including Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski emerged as one of Carter's closest advisers, and Carter made use of both the National Security Council and Vance's State Department in developing and implementing foreign policy. [27] The hawkish Brzezinski clashed frequently with Vance, who pushed for detente with the Soviet Union. [28] [ page needed ]

Vice President Mondale served as a key adviser on both foreign and domestic issues. [29] First Lady Rosalynn Carter emerged as an important part of the administration, sitting in on several Cabinet meetings and serving as a sounding board, advisor, and surrogate for the president. She traveled abroad to negotiate foreign policy, and some polling found that she was tied with Mother Teresa as the most admired woman in the world. [30]

Carter shook up the White House staff in mid-1978, bringing in advertising executive Gerald Rafshoon to serve as the White House Communications Director and Anne Wexler to lead the Office of Public Liaison. [31] Carter implemented broad personnel changes in the White House and cabinet in mid-1979. Five cabinet secretaries left office, including Blumenthal, Bell, and Joseph Califano, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Jordan was selected as the president's first chief of staff, while Alonzo L. McDonald, formerly of McKinsey & Company, became the White House staff director. Federal Reserve Chairman G. William Miller replaced Blumenthal as Secretary of the Treasury, Benjamin Civiletti took office as Attorney General, and Charles Duncan Jr. became Secretary of Energy. [32] After Vance resigned in 1980, Carter appointed Edmund Muskie, a well-respected Senator with whom Carter had developed friendly relations, to serve as Secretary of State. [33]

Among presidents who served at least one full term, Carter is the only one who never made an appointment to the Supreme Court. [34] Carter appointed 56 judges to the United States Courts of Appeals, and 203 judges to the United States district courts. Two of his circuit court appointees – Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg – were later appointed to the Supreme Court by Bill Clinton. Carter was the first president to make demographic diversity a key priority in the selection of judicial nominees. [35] During Carter's presidency, the number of female circuit court judges increased from one to twelve, the number of non-white male circuit judges increased from six to thirteen, the number of female district court judges increased from four to 32, and the number of non-white male district court judges increased from 23 to 55. Carter appointed the first female African-American circuit court judge, Amalya Lyle Kearse, the first Hispanic circuit court judge, Reynaldo Guerra Garza, and the first female Hispanic district court judge, Carmen Consuelo Cerezo. [36] Federal Judicial Center data shows that Carter appointed more women (41) and people of color (57) than had been appointed by all past presidents combined (10 women and 35 people of color). [37]

President Carter was not a product of the New Deal traditions of liberal Northern Democrats. Instead he traced his ideological background to the Progressive Era. He was thus much more conservative than the dominant liberal wing of the party could accept. [38] British historian Iwan Morgan argues:

Carter traced his political values to early twentieth-century southern progressivism with its concern for economy and efficiency in government and compassion for the poor. He described himself as a fiscal conservative, but liberal on matters like civil rights, the environment, and "helping people to overcome handicaps to lead fruitful lives," an ideological construct that appeared to make him the legatee of Dwight Eisenhower rather than Franklin D. Roosevelt. [39]

Relations with Congress Edit

Carter successfully campaigned as a Washington "outsider" critical of both President Gerald Ford and the Democratic Congress as president, he continued this theme. This refusal to play by the rules of Washington contributed to the Carter administration's difficult relationship with Congress. After the election, the President demanded the power to reorganize the executive branch, alienating powerful Democrats like Speaker Tip O'Neill and Jack Brooks. During the Nixon administration, Congress had passed a series of reforms that removed power from the president, and most members of Congress were unwilling to restore that power even with a Democrat now in office. [40] [b] Unreturned phone calls, verbal insults, and an unwillingness to trade political favors soured many on Capitol Hill and affected the president's ability to enact his agenda. [42] In many cases, these failures of communication stemmed not from intentional neglect, but rather from poor organization of the administration's congressional liaison functions. [43] President Carter attempted to woo O'Neill, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, and other members of Congress through personal engagement, but he was generally unable to rally support for his programs through these meetings. [44] Carter also erred in focusing on too many priorities at once, especially in the first months of his presidency. [45] Democrats in Congress were displeased with his moralistic, executive-oriented, rational approach to decision-making and his reluctance to accept standard congressional methods of compromise, patronage, and log-rolling. [46]

A few months after his term started, Carter issued a "hit list" of 19 projects that he claimed were "pork barrel" spending. He said that he would veto any legislation that contained projects on this list. [47] Congress responded by passing a bill that combined several of the projects that Carter objected to with economic stimulus measures that Carter favored. Carter chose to sign the bill, but his criticism of the alleged "pork barrel" projects cost him support in Congress. [48] These struggles set a pattern for Carter's presidency, and he would frequently clash with Congress for the remainder of his tenure. [49]

Budget policies Edit

On taking office, Carter proposed an economic stimulus package that would give each citizen a $50 tax rebate, cut corporate taxes by $900 million, and increase spending on public works. The limited spending involved in the package reflected Carter's fiscal conservatism, as he was more concerned with avoiding inflation and balancing the budget than addressing unemployment. Carter's resistance to higher federal spending drew attacks from many members of his own party, who wanted to lower the unemployment rate through federal public works projects. Carter signed several measures designed to address unemployment in 1977, including an extension of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, but he continued to focus primarily on reducing deficits and inflation. In November 1978, Carter signed the Revenue Act of 1978, an $18.7 billion tax cut. [50]

Federal budget deficits throughout Carter's term remained at around the $70 billion level reached in 1976, but as a percentage of GDP the deficits fell from 4% when he took office to 2.5% in the 1980–81 fiscal year. [51] The national debt of the United States increased by about $280 billion, from $620 billion in early 1977 to $900 billion in late 1980. [52] However, because economic growth outpaced the growth in nominal debt, the federal government's debt as a percentage of gross domestic product decreased slightly, from 33.6% in early 1977 to 31.8% in late 1980. [53]

Energy Edit

National Energy Act Edit

In 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), based in the Middle East, had reduced output to raise world prices and to hurt Israel and its allies, including the United States. [54] This sparked the 1973 Oil Crisis, a period of high oil prices, which in turn forcing higher prices throughout the American economy and slowed economic growth. [55] The United States continued to face energy issues in the following years, and during the winter of 1976–1977 natural gas shortages forced the closure of many schools and factories, leading to the temporary layoffs of hundreds of thousands of workers. [56] By 1977, energy policy was one of the greatest challenges facing the United States. Oil imports had increased 65% annually since 1973, and the U.S. consumed over twice as much energy, per capita, as other developed countries. [49]

Upon taking office, Carter asked James Schlesinger to develop a plan to address the energy crisis. [57] In an address to the nation of April 18, 1977, Carter called the energy crisis as, apart from preventing war, "the greatest challenge that our country will face during our lifetime." He called for energy conservation, increased use of U.S. coal reserves, and carefully controlled expansion of nuclear power. His chief goals were to limit the growth of energy demand to an increase of two percent a year, cut oil imports in half, and establish a new strategic petroleum reserve containing a six-month supply. [58] Carter won congressional approval for the creation of the Department of Energy, and he named Schlesinger as the first head of that department. Schlesinger presented an energy plan that contained 113 provisions, the most important of which were taxes on domestic oil production and gasoline consumption. The plan also provided for tax credits for energy conservation, taxes on automobiles with low fuel efficiency, and mandates to convert from oil or natural gas to coal power. [59] The House approved much of Carter's plan in August 1977, but the Senate passed a series of watered-down energy bills that included few of Carter's proposals. Negotiations with Congress dragged on into 1978, but Carter signed the National Energy Act in November 1978. Many of Carter's original proposals were not included in the legislation, but the act deregulated natural gas and encouraged energy conservation and the development of renewable energy through tax credits. [60]

1979 energy crisis Edit

Another energy shortage hit the United States in 1979, forcing millions of frustrated motorists into long waits at gasoline stations. In response, Carter asked Congress to deregulate the price of domestic oil. At the time, domestic oil prices were not set by the world market, but rather by the complex price controls of the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). Oil companies strongly favored the deregulation of prices, since it would increase their profits, but some members of Congress worried that deregulation would contribute to inflation. In late April and early May the Gallup poll found only 14 percent of the public believed that America was in an actual energy shortage. The other 77 percent believed that this was brought on by oil companies just to make a profit. [61] Carter paired the deregulation proposal with a windfall profits tax, which would return about half of the new profits of the oil companies to the federal government. Carter used a provision of EPCA to phase in oil controls, but Congress balked at implementing the proposed tax. [62] [63]

In July 1979, as the energy crisis continued, Carter met with a series of business, government, labor, academic, and religious leaders in an effort to overhaul his administration's policies. [65] His pollster, Pat Caddell, told him that the American people faced a crisis of confidence stemming from the assassinations of major leaders in the 1960s, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal. [66] Though most of his other top advisers urged him to continue to focus on inflation and the energy crisis, Carter seized on Caddell's notion that the major crisis facing the country was a crisis of confidence. On July 15, Carter delivered a nationally televised speech in which he called for long-term limits on oil imports and the development of synthetic fuels. But he also stated, "all the legislation in the world can't fix what's wrong with America. What is lacking is confidence and a sense of community." [67] The speech came to be known as his "malaise" speech, although Carter never used the word in the speech. [68] [69]

The initial reaction to Carter's speech was generally positive, but Carter erred by forcing out several cabinet members, including Secretary of Energy Schlesinger, later in July. [70] Nonetheless, Congress approved a $227 billion windfall profits tax and passed the Energy Security Act. The Energy Security Act established the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, which was charged with developing alternative energy sources. [71] Despite those legislative victories, in 1980 Congress rescinded Carter's imposition of a surcharge on imported oil, [c] and rejected his proposed Energy Mobilization Board, a government body that was designed to facilitate the construction of power plants. [73] Nonetheless, Kaufman and Kaufman write that policies enacted under Carter represented the "most sweeping energy legislation in the nation's history." [71] Carter's policies contributed to a decrease in per capita energy consumption, which dropped by 10 percent from 1979 to 1983. [74] Oil imports, which had reached a record 2.4 billion barrels in 1977 (50% of supply), declined by half from 1979 to 1983. [51]

Economy Edit

Federal finances and GDP during Carter's presidency [75]
Fiscal
Year
Receipts Outlays Surplus/
Deficit
GDP Debt as a %
of GDP [76]
1977 355.6 409.2 –53.7 2,024.3 27.1
1978 399.6 458.7 –59.2 2,273.5 26.7
1979 463.3 504.0 –40.7 2,565.6 25.0
1980 517.1 590.9 –73.8 2,791.9 25.5
1981 599.3 678.2 –79.0 3,133.2 25.2
Ref. [77] [78] [79]

Carter took office during a period of "stagflation", as the economy experienced both high inflation and low economic growth. [80] The U.S. had recovered from the 1973–75 recession, but the economy, and especially inflation, continued to be a top concern for many Americans in 1977 and 1978. [81] The economy had grown by 5% in 1976, and it continued to grow at a similar pace during 1977 and 1978. [82] Unemployment declined from 7.5% in January 1977 to 5.6% by May 1979, with over 9 million net new jobs created during that interim, [83] and real median household income grew by 5% from 1976 to 1978. [84] In October 1978, responding to worsening inflation, Carter announced the beginning of "phase two" of his anti-inflation campaign on national television. He appointed Alfred E. Kahn as the Chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS), and COWPS announced price targets for industries and implemented other policies designed to lower inflation. [85]

The 1979 energy crisis ended a period of growth both inflation and interest rates rose, while economic growth, job creation, and consumer confidence declined sharply. [86] The relatively loose monetary policy adopted by Federal Reserve Board Chairman G. William Miller, had already contributed to somewhat higher inflation, [87] rising from 5.8% in 1976 to 7.7% in 1978. The sudden doubling of crude oil prices by OPEC [88] forced inflation to double-digit levels, averaging 11.3% in 1979 and 13.5% in 1980. [51]

Following a mid-1979 cabinet shake-up, Carter named Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. [89] Volcker pursued a tight monetary policy to bring down inflation, but this policy also had the effect of slowing economic growth even further. [90] Author Ivan Eland points out that this came during a long trend of inflation, saying, "Easy money and cheap credit during the 1970s, had caused rampant inflation, which topped out at 13 percent in 1979." [91] Carter enacted an austerity program by executive order, justifying these measures by observing that inflation had reached a "crisis stage" both inflation and short-term interest rates reached 18 percent in February and March 1980. [92] In March, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell to its lowest level since mid-1976, and the following month unemployment rose to seven percent. [93] The economy entered into another recession, its fourth in little more than a decade, [91] and unemployment quickly rose to 7.8 percent. [94] This "V-shaped recession" and the malaise accompanying it coincided with Carter's 1980 re-election campaign, and contributed to his unexpectedly severe loss to Ronald Reagan. [95] Not until March 1981 did GDP and employment totals regain pre-recession levels. [82] [83]

Health care Edit

During the 1976 presidential campaign, Carter proposed a health care reform plan that included key features of a bipartisan bill, sponsored by Senator Ted Kennedy, that provided for the establishment of a universal national health insurance (NHI) system. [96] Though most Americans had health insurance through Medicare, Medicaid, or private plans, approximately ten percent of the population did not have coverage in 1977. The establishment of an NHI plan was the top priority of organized labor and many liberal Democrats, but Carter had concerns about cost, as well as the inflationary impact, of such a system. He delayed consideration of health care through 1977, and ultimately decided that he would not support Kennedy's proposal to establish an NHI system that covered all Americans. Kennedy met repeatedly with Carter and White House staffers in an attempt to forge a compromise health care plan, but negotiations broke down in July 1978. Though Kennedy and Carter had previously been on good terms, differences over health insurance led to an open break between the two Democratic leaders. [97]

In June 1979, Carter proposed more limited health insurance reform—an employer mandate to provide private catastrophic health insurance. The plan would also extend Medicaid to the very poor without dependent minor children, and would add catastrophic coverage to Medicare. [98] Kennedy rejected the plan as insufficient. [99] In November 1979, Senator Russell B. Long led a bipartisan conservative majority of the Senate Finance Committee to support an employer mandate to provide catastrophic coverage and the addition of catastrophic coverage to Medicare. [98] These efforts were abandoned in 1980 due to budget constraints. [100]

Welfare and tax reform proposals Edit

Carter sought a comprehensive overhaul of welfare programs in order to provide more cost-effective aid Congress rejected almost all of his proposals. [101] Proposals contemplated by the Carter administration include a guaranteed minimum income, a federal job guarantee for the unemployed, a negative income tax, and direct cash payments to aid recipients. In early 1977, Secretary Califano presented Carter with several options for welfare reform, all of which Carter rejected because they increased government spending. In August 1977, Carter proposed a major jobs program for welfare recipients capable of working and a "decent income" to those who were incapable of working. [102] Carter was unable to win support for his welfare reform proposals, and they never received a vote in Congress. [103] In October 1978, Carter helped convince the Senate to pass the Humphrey–Hawkins Full Employment Act, which committed the federal government to the goals of low inflation and low unemployment. To the disappointment of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and organized labor, the final act did not include a provision authorizing the federal government to act as an employer of last resort in order to provide for full employment. [104]

Carter also sought tax reform in order to create a simpler, more progressive taxation system. He proposed taxing capital gains as ordinary income, eliminating tax shelters, limiting itemized tax deductions, and increasing the standard deduction. [105] Carter's taxation proposals were rejected by Congress, and no major tax reform bill was passed during Carter's presidency. [106] Amid growing public fear that the social security system was in danger of bankruptcy within a few years, Carter signed the Social Security Financing Amendments Act in December 1977, which corrected a flaw that had been introduced into the benefit formula by earlier legislation in 1972, raised Social Security taxes and reduced Social Security benefits. "Now this legislation", the president remarked, "will guarantee that from 1980 to the year 2030, the social security funds will be sound". [107] [108]

Environment Edit

Carter supported many of the goals of the environmentalist movement, and appointed prominent environmentalists to high positions. As president his rhetoric strongly supported environmentalism, with a certain softness regarding his acceptance of nuclear energy – he had been trained in nuclear energy with atomic submarines in the Navy. [109] He signed several significant bills to protect the environment, such as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which regulates strip mining. [110] In 1980 Carter signed into law a bill that established Superfund, a federal program designed to clean up mining or factory sites contaminated with hazardous substances. [111] Other environmental laws signed by Carter addressed energy conservation, federal mine safety standards, and control of pesticides. [112] Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus convinced Carter to withdraw over 100 million acres of public domain land in Alaska from commercial use by designating the land as conservation areas. The 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act doubled the amount of public land set aside for national parks and wildlife refuges. [113] [114] Business and conservative interests complained that economic growth would be hurt by these conservation efforts. [115]

Education Edit

Early in his term, Carter worked to fulfill a campaign promise to teachers' unions to create a cabinet-level Department of Education. Carter argued that the establishment of the department would increase efficiency and equal opportunity, but opponents in both parties criticized it as an additional layer of bureaucracy that would reduce local control and local support of education. [116] In October 1979, Carter signed the Department of Education Organization Act, establishing the United States Department of Education. Carter appointed Shirley Mount Hufstedler, a liberal judge from California, as the first Secretary of Education. [117] Carter also expanded the Head Start program with the addition of 43,000 children and families. [118] During his tenure, education spending as a share of federal, non-defense spending was doubled. [119] Carter opposed tax breaks for Protestant schools in the South, many of which were fighting integration, a position that alienated the Religious Right. [120] He also helped defeat the Moynihan-Packwood Bill, which called for tuition tax credits for parents to use for nonpublic school education. [121]

Other initiatives Edit

Carter took a stance in support of decriminalization of cannabis, citing the legislation passed in Oregon in 1973. [122] In a 1977 address to Congress, Carter submitted that penalties for cannabis use should not outweigh the actual harms of cannabis consumption. Carter retained pro-decriminalization advisor Robert Du Pont, and appointed pro-decriminalization British physician Peter Bourne as his drug advisor (or "drug czar") to head up his newly formed Office of Drug Abuse Policy. [123] [124] However, law enforcement, conservative politicians, and grassroots parents' groups opposed this measure, and the War on Drugs continued. [123] [125] At the same time, cannabis consumption in the United States reached historically high levels. [126]

Carter was the first president to address the topic of gay rights, and his administration was the first to meet with a group of gay rights activists. [127] [128] Carter opposed the Briggs Initiative, a California ballot measure that would have banned gays and supporters of gay rights from being public school teachers. [128] Carter supported the policy of affirmative action, and his administration submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court while it heard the case of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. The Supreme Court's holding, delivered in 1978, upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action but prohibited the use of racial quotas in college admissions. [129] First Lady Rosalynn Carter publicly campaigned for the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, and the president supported the extension of the ratification period for that amendment. [130]

Carter presided over the deregulation of several industries, which proponents hoped would help revive the sluggish economy. The Airline Deregulation Act (1978) abolished the Civil Aeronautics Board over six years, provided for the free entry of airlines into new routes, and opened air fares up to competition. [131] Carter also signed the Motor Carrier Act (1980), which gradually withdrew the government from controlling access, rates, and routes in the trucking industry the Staggers Rail Act (1980), which loosened railroad regulations by allowing railroad executives to negotiate mergers with barge and truck lines [132] and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (1980), which removed ceilings on interest rates and permitted savings and commercial banks to write home mortgages, extend business loans, and underwrite securities issues. [131]

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 set up Urban Development Action Grants, extended handicapped and elderly provisions, and established the Community Reinvestment Act, [133] which sought to prevent banks from denying credit and loans to poor communities. [134]

Although foreign policy was not his highest priority at first, a series of worsening crises made it increasingly the focus of attention regarding the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Iran, and the global energy crisis. [135]

Cold War Edit

Carter took office during the Cold War, a sustained period of geopolitical tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, relations between the two superpowers had improved through a policy known as detente. In a reflection of the waning importance of the Cold War, some of Carter's contemporaries labeled him as the first post-Cold War president, but relations with the Soviet Union would continue to be an important factor in American foreign policy in the late 1970s and the 1980s. Many of the leading officials in the Carter administration, including Carter himself, were members of the Trilateral Commission, which de-emphasized the Cold War. The Trilateral Commission instead advocated a foreign policy focused on aid to Third World countries and improved relations with Western Europe and Japan. The central tension of the Carter administration's foreign policy was reflected in the division between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who sought improved relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World, and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who favored confrontation with the Soviet Union on a range of issues. [136]

Human rights Edit

Carter believed that previous administrations had erred in allowing the Cold War concerns and Realpolitik to dominate foreign policy. His administration placed a new emphasis on human rights, democratic values, nuclear proliferation, and global poverty. [137] [138] The Carter administration's human rights emphasis was part of a broader, worldwide focus on human rights in the 1970s, as non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch became increasingly prominent. Carter nominated civil rights activist Patricia M. Derian as Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and in August 1977, had the post elevated to that of Assistant Secretary of State. Derian established the United States' Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, published annually since 1977. [139] Latin America was central to Carter's new focus on human rights. [140] The Carter administration ended support to the historically U.S.-backed Somoza regime in Nicaragua and directed aid to the new Sandinista National Liberation Front government that assumed power after Somoza's overthrow. Carter also cut back or terminated military aid to Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Ernesto Geisel of Brazil, and Jorge Rafael Videla of Argentina, all of whom he criticized for human rights violations. [141]

Carter's ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, was the first African-American to hold a high-level diplomatic post. Along with Carter, he sought to change U.S. policy towards Africa, emphasizing human rights concerns over Cold War issues. [142] In 1978, Carter became the first sitting president to make an official state visit to Sub-Saharan Africa, [143] a reflection of the region's new importance under the Carter administration's foreign policy. [144] Unlike his predecessors, Carter took a strong stance against white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. With Carter's support, the United Nations passed Resolution 418, which placed an arms embargo on South Africa. Carter won the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which had undercut international sanctions on the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith. He also pressured Smith to hold elections, leading to the 1979 Rhodesia elections and the eventual creation of Zimbabwe. [145]

The more assertive human rights policy championed by Derian and State Department Policy Planning Director Anthony Lake was somewhat blunted by the opposition of Brzezinski. Policy disputes reached their most contentious point during the 1979 fall of Pol Pot's genocidal regime of Democratic Kampuchea following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, when Brzezinski prevailed in having the administration refuse to recognize the new Cambodian government due to its support by the Soviet Union. [146] Despite human rights concerns, Carter continued U.S. support for Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, who defeated Angolan-backed insurgents in conflicts known as Shaba I and Shaba II. [147] His administration also generally refrained from criticizing human rights abuses in the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen. [148] [149]

SALT II Edit

Ford and Nixon had sought to reach agreement on a second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which had set upper limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. [150] Carter hoped to extend these talks by reaching an agreement to reduce, rather than merely set upper limits on, the nuclear arsenals of both countries. [151] At the same time, he criticized the Soviet Union's record with regard to human rights, partly because he believed the public would not support negotiations with the Soviets if the president seemed too willing to accommodate the Soviets. Carter and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev reached an agreement in June 1979 in the form of SALT II, but Carter's waning popularity and the opposition of Republicans and neoconservative Democrats made ratification difficult. [152] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan severely damaged U.S.-Soviet relations and ended any hope of ratifying SALT II.

Afghanistan Edit

Afghanistan had been non-aligned during the early stages of the Cold War, but a 1973 coup had brought a pro-Western government into power. [153] Five years later, Communists under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki seized power. [154] The new regime—which was divided between Taraki's extremist Khalq faction and the more moderate Parcham—signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in December 1978. [154] [155] Taraki's efforts to improve secular education and redistribute land were accompanied by mass executions and political oppression unprecedented in Afghan history, igniting a revolt by mujahideen rebels. [154] Following a general uprising in April 1979, Taraki was deposed by Khalq rival Hafizullah Amin in September. [154] [155] Soviet leaders feared that an Islamist government in Afghanistan would threaten the control of Soviet Central Asia, and, as the unrest continued, they deployed 30,000 soldiers to the Soviet–Afghan border. [156] Carter and Brzezinski both saw Afghanistan as a potential "trap" that could expend Soviet resources in a fruitless war, and the U.S. began sending aid to the mujahideen rebels in early 1979. [157] By December, Amin's government had lost control of much of the country, prompting the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan, execute Amin, and install Parcham leader Babrak Karmal as president. [154] [155]

Carter was surprised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community during 1978 and 1979 was that Moscow would not forcefully intervene. [158] CIA officials had tracked the deployment of Soviet soldiers to the Afghan border, but they had not expected the Soviets to launch a full-fledged invasion. [159] Carter believed that the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan would present a grave threat to the Persian Gulf region, and he vigorously responded to what he considered a dangerous provocation. [160] In a televised speech, Carter announced sanctions on the Soviet Union, promised renewed aid to Pakistan, and articulated the Carter doctrine, which stated that the U.S. would repel any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf. [161] [162] Pakistani leader Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq had previously had poor relations with Carter due to Pakistan's nuclear program and the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and instability in Iran reinvigorated the traditional Pakistan–United States alliance. [158] In cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Carter increased aid to the mujahideen through the CIA's Operation Cyclone. [162] Carter also later announced a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow [163] and imposed an embargo on shipping American wheat to the Soviet Union. The embargo ultimately hurt American farmers more than it did the Soviet economy, and the United States lifted the embargo after Carter left office. [164]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought a significant change in Carter's foreign policy and ended the period of detente that had begun in the mid-1960s. [165] Returning to a policy of containment, the United States reconciled with Cold War allies and increased the defense budget, leading to a new arms race with the Soviet Union. [166] U.S. support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan would continue until the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. [158]

Middle East Edit

Camp David Accords Edit

On taking office, Carter decided to attempt to mediate the long-running Arab–Israeli conflict. [167] [168] He sought a comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors through a reconvening of the 1973 Geneva Conference, but these efforts had collapsed by the end of 1977. [169] Carter did convince Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat to visit Israel in 1978. Sadat's visit drew the condemnation of other Arab League countries, but Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin each expressed an openness to bilateral talks. Begin sought security guarantees Sadat sought the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula and home rule for the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli-occupied territories that were largely populated by Palestinian Arabs. Israel had taken control of the West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 Six-Day War, while the Sinai had been occupied by Israel since the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. [170]

Seeking to further negotiations, Carter invited Begin and Sadat to the presidential retreat of Camp David in September 1978. Because direct negotiations between Sadat and Begin proved unproductive, Carter began meeting with the two leaders individually. [171] While Begin was willing to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, he refused to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel had begun constructing settlements in the West Bank, which emerged as an important barrier to a peace agreement. Unable to come to definitive settlement over an Israeli withdrawal, the two sides reached an agreement in which Israel promised to allow the creation of an elected government in the West Bank and Gaza. In return, Egypt became the first Arab state to recognize Israel's right to exist. The Camp David Accords were the subject of intense domestic opposition in both Egypt and Israel, as well as the wider Arab World, but each side agreed to negotiate a peace treaty on the basis of the accords. [172]

On March 26, 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in Washington, [173] Carter's role in getting the treaty was essential. Author Aaron David Miller concluded the following: "No matter whom I spoke to — Americans, Egyptians, or Israelis — most everyone said the same thing: no Carter, no peace treaty." [174] Carter himself viewed the agreement as his most important accomplishment in office. [172]

Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis Edit

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, had been a reliable U.S. ally since the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. During the years after the coup, the U.S. lavished aid on Iran, while Iran served as a dependable source of oil exports. [175] Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski all viewed Iran as a key Cold War ally, not only for the oil it produced but also because of its influence in OPEC and its strategic position between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. [176] Despite human rights violations, Carter visited Iran in late 1977 and authorized the sale of U.S. fighter aircraft. That same year, rioting broke out in several cities, and it soon spread across the country. Poor economic conditions, the unpopularity of Pahlavi's "White Revolution", and an Islamic revival all led to increasing anger among Iranians, many of whom also despised the United States for its support of Pahlavi and its role in the 1953 coup. [175]

By 1978, the Iranian Revolution had broken out against the Shah's rule. [177] Secretary of State Vance argued that the Shah should institute a series of reforms to appease the voices of discontent, while Brzezinski argued in favor of a crackdown on dissent. The mixed messages that the Shah received from Vance and Brzezinski contributed to his confusion and indecision. The Shah went into exile, leaving a caretaker government in control. A popular religious figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, returned from exile in February 1979 to popular acclaim. As the unrest continued, Carter allowed Pahlavi into the United States for medical treatment. [178] Carter and Vance were both initially reluctant to admit Pahlavi due to concerns about the reaction in Iran, but Iranian leaders assured them that it would not cause an issue. [179] In November 1979, shortly after Pahlavi was allowed to enter the U.S., a group of Iranians stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took 66 American captives, beginning the Iran hostage crisis. [178] Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan ordered the militants to release the hostages, but he resigned from office after Khomeini backed the militants. [179]

The crisis quickly became the subject of international and domestic attention, and Carter vowed to secure the release of the hostages. He refused the Iranian demand of the return of Pahlavi in exchange for the release of the hostages. His approval ratings rose as Americans rallied around his response, but the crisis became increasingly problematic for his administration as it continued. [180] In an attempt to rescue the hostages, Carter launched Operation Eagle Claw in April 1980. The operation was a total disaster, and it ended in the death of eight American soldiers. The failure of the operation strengthened Ayatollah Khomeini's position in Iran and badly damaged Carter's domestic standing. [181] Carter was dealt another blow when Vance, who had consistently opposed the operation, resigned. [182] Iran refused to negotiate the return of the hostages until Iraq launched an invasion in September 1980. With Algeria serving as an intermediary, negotiations continued until an agreement was reached in January 1981. In return for releasing the 52 captives, Iran was allowed access to over $7 billion of its money that had been frozen in the United States. Iran waited to release the captives until 30 minutes after Carter left office on January 20, 1981. [183]

Latin America Edit

Panama Canal treaties Edit

Since the 1960s, Panama had called for the United States to cede control of the Panama Canal. [184] The bipartisan national policy of turning over the Canal to Panama had been established by presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford, but negotiations had dragged on for a dozen years. Carter made the cession of the Panama Canal a priority, believing it would implement Carter's call for a moral cleaning of American foreign policy and win approval across Latin America as a gracious apology for American wrongdoing. He also feared that another postponement of negotiations might precipitate violent upheaval in Panama, which could damage or block the canal. [185]

The Carter administration negotiated the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, two treaties which provided that Panama would gain control of the canal in 1999. [186] Carter's initiative faced wide resistance in the United States, and many in the public, particularly conservatives, thought that Carter was "giving away" a crucial U.S. asset. [187] Conservatives formed groups such as the Committee to Save the Panama Canal in an attempt to defeat the treaties in the Senate, but Carter made ratification of the treaties his top priority. During the ratification debate, the Senate crafted amendments that granted the U.S. the right to intervene militarily to keep the canal open, which the Panamanians assented to after further negotiations. [188] In March 1978, the Senate ratified both treaties by a margin of 68-to-32, narrowly passing the two-thirds margin necessary for ratification. The Canal Zone and all its facilities were ultimately turned over to Panama on December 31, 1999. [189] [190]

Cuba Edit

Carter hoped to improve relations with Cuba upon taking office, but any thaw in relations was prevented by ongoing Cold War disputes in Central America and Africa. In early 1980, Cuban leader Fidel Castro announced that anyone who wished to leave Cuba would be allowed to do so through the port of Mariel. After Carter announced that the United States would provide "open arms for the tens of thousands of refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination", Cuban Americans arranged the Mariel boatlift. The Refugee Act, signed earlier in the year, had provided for annual cap of 19,500 Cuban immigrants to the United States per year, and required that those refugees go through a review process. By September, 125,000 Cubans had arrived in the United States, and many faced a lack of inadequate food and housing. Carter was widely criticized for his handling of the boatlift, especially in the electorally important state of Florida. [191]

Asia Edit

Rapprochement with China Edit

Continuing a rapprochement begun during the Nixon administration, Carter successfully achieved closer relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). [192] The two countries increasingly collaborated against the Soviet Union, and the Carter administration tacitly consented to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. In 1979, Carter extended formal diplomatic recognition to the PRC for the first time. This decision led to a boom in trade between the United States and the PRC, which was pursuing economic reforms under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. [193] After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter allowed the sale of military supplies to China and began negotiations to share military intelligence. [194] In January 1980, Carter unilaterally revoked the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (ROC), which had lost control of mainland China to the PRC in the Chinese Civil War, but was now based offshore on the island of Taiwan. Carter's abrogation of the treaty was challenged in court by conservative Republicans, but the Supreme Court ruled that the issue was a non-justiciable political question in Goldwater v. Carter. The U.S. continued to maintain diplomatic contacts with the ROC through the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. [195]

South Korea Edit

One of Carter's first acts was to order the withdrawal of troops from South Korea, which had hosted a large number of U.S. military personnel since the end of the Korean War. Carter believed that the soldiers could be put to better use in Western Europe, but opponents of the withdrawal feared that North Korea would invade South Korea in the aftermath of the withdrawal. South Korea and Japan both protested the move, as did many members of Congress, the military, and the State Department. After a strong backlash, Carter delayed the withdrawal, and ultimately only a fraction of the U.S. forces left South Korea. Carter's attempt to remove U.S. forces from South Korea weakened the government of South Korean President Park Chung-hee, who was assassinated in 1979. [196]

Africa Edit

In sharp contrast to Nixon and Ford, Carter gave priority to sub-Sahara Africa. [197] [198] Southern Africa especially emerged as a Cold War battleground after Cuba sent a large military force that took control of Angola in 1976. [ citation needed ] The chief policy person for Africa in the Carter administration was Andrew Young, a leader in the black Atlanta community who became Ambassador to the United Nations. Young opened up friendly relationships with key leaders, especially in Nigeria. A highly controversial issue was independence of Namibia from Union of South Africa. Young began United Nations discussions which went nowhere, and Namibia would not gain independence until long after Carter left office. [199] Young advocated strong sanctions after the murder by South African police of Steve Biko in 1977, but Carter refused and only imposed a limited arms embargo and South Africa ignored the protests. [200] The most important success of the Carter administration in Africa was helping the transition from white-dominated Southern Rhodesia to black rule in Zimbabwe. [201] [202]

List of international trips Edit

Carter made 12 international trips to 25 nations during his presidency. [203]

Dates Country Locations Details
1 May 5–11, 1977 United Kingdom London,
Newcastle
Attended the 3rd G7 summit. Also met with the prime ministers of Greece, Belgium, Turkey, Norway, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and with the President of Portugal. Addressed NATO Ministers meeting.
May 9, 1977 Switzerland Geneva Official visit. Met with President Kurt Furgler. Also met with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.
2 December 29–31, 1977 Poland Warsaw Official visit. Met with First Secretary Edward Gierek.
December 31, 1977 – January 1, 1978 Iran Tehran Official visit. Met with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and King Hussein of Jordan.
January 1–3, 1978 India New Delhi, Daulatpur Nasirabad [204] Met with President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy and Prime Minister Morarji Desai. Addressed Parliament of India.
January 3–4, 1978 Saudi Arabia Riyadh Met with King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd.
January 4, 1978 Egypt Aswan Met with President Anwar Sadat and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.
January 4–6, 1978 France Paris,
Normandy,
Bayeux,
Versailles
Met with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Raymond Barre.
January 6, 1978 Belgium Brussels Met with King Baudouin and Prime Minister Leo Tindemans. Attended meetings of the Commission of the European Communities and the North Atlantic Council.
3 March 28–29, 1978 Venezuela Caracas Met with President Carlos Andrés Pérez. Addressed Congress and signed maritime boundary agreement.
March 29–31, 1978 Brazil Brasília
Rio de Janeiro
Official visit. Met with President Ernesto Geisel and addressed National Congress.
March 31 – April 3, 1978 Nigeria Lagos State visit. Met with President Olusegun Obasanjo.
April 3, 1978 Liberia Monrovia Met with President William R. Tolbert, Jr.
4 June 16–17, 1978 Panama Panama City Invited by President Demetrio B. Lakas and General Omar Torrijos to sign protocol confirming exchange of documents ratifying Panama Canal treaties. Also met informally with Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, Colombian President Alfonso López Michelsen, Mexican President José López Portillo, Costa Rican Rodrigo Carazo Odio and Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica.
5 July 14–15, 1978 West Germany Bonn,
Wiesbaden-Erbenheim,
Frankfurt
State visit. Met with President Walter Scheel and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Addressed U.S. and German military personnel.
July 15, 1978 West Germany West Berlin Spoke at the Berlin Airlift Memorial.
July 16–17, 1978 West Germany Bonn Attended the 4th G7 summit.
6 January 4–9, 1979 France Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe Met informally with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister James Callaghan.
7 February 14–16, 1979 Mexico Mexico City State visit. Met with President José López Portillo. Addressed the Mexican Congress.
8 March 7–9, 1979 Egypt Cairo,
Alexandria,
Giza
State visit. Met with President Anwar Sadat. Addressed People's Assembly of Egypt.
March 10–13, 1979 Israel Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem
State visit. Met with President Yitzhak Navon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Addressed the Knesset.
March 13, 1979 Egypt Cairo Met with President Anwar Sadat.
9 June 14–18, 1979 Austria Vienna State visit. Met with President Rudolf Kirchschläger and Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. Met with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to sign SALT II Treaty.
10 June 25–29, 1979 Japan Tokyo,
Shimoda
Attended the 5th G7 summit. State visit. Met with Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira.
June 29 – July 1, 1979 South Korea Seoul State visit. Met with President Park Chung-hee and Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah.
11 June 19–24, 1980 Italy Rome,
Venice
Attended the 6th G7 summit. State Visit. Met with President Sandro Pertini.
June 21, 1980 Vatican City Apostolic Palace Audience with Pope John Paul II.
June 24–25, 1980 Yugoslavia Belgrade Official visit. Met with President Cvijetin Mijatović.
June 25–26, 1980 Spain Madrid Official visit. Met with King Juan Carlos I and Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez.
June 26–30, 1980 Portugal Lisbon Official visit. Met with President António Ramalho Eanes and Prime Minister Francisco de Sá Carneiro.
12 July 9–10, 1980 Japan Tokyo Official visit. Attended memorial services for former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira. Met with Emperor Hirohito, Bangla President Ziaur Rahman, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda and Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng.

OMB Director Bert Lance resigned his position on September 21, 1977, amid allegations of improper banking activities prior to his becoming director. [205] The controversy over Lance damaged Carter's standing with Congress and the public, and Lance's resignation removed one of Carter's most effective advisers from office. [206] In April 1979, Attorney General Bell appointed Paul J. Curran as a special counsel to investigate loans made to the peanut business owned by Carter by a bank controlled by Bert Lance. Unlike Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski who were named as special prosecutors to investigate the Watergate scandal, Curran's position as special counsel meant that he would not be able to file charges on his own, but would require the approval of Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann. [207] Carter became the first sitting president to testify under oath as part of an investigation of that president. [208] The investigation was concluded in October 1979, with Curran announcing that no evidence had been found to support allegations that funds loaned from the National Bank of Georgia had been diverted to Carter's 1976 presidential campaign. [209]

Carter's brother Billy generated a great deal of notoriety during Carter's presidency for his colorful and often outlandish public behavior. [210] The Senate began an investigation into Billy Carter's activities after it was disclosed that Libya had given Billy over $200,000 for unclear reasons. [49] The controversy over Billy Carter's relation to Libya became known as "Billygate", and, while the president had no personal involvement in it, Billygate nonetheless damaged the Carter administration. [211]

In April 1978, polling showed that Carter's approval rating had declined precipitously, and a Gallup survey found Carter trailing Ted Kennedy for the 1980 Democratic nomination. [212] By mid-1979, Carter faced an energy crisis, rampant inflation, slow economic growth, and the widespread perception that his administration was incompetent. [213] In November 1979, Kennedy announced that he would challenge Carter in the 1980 Democratic primaries. [214] Carter's polling numbers shot up following the start of the Iran hostage crisis, [215] and his response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further boosted his prospects in the Democratic primaries. [160] Carter dominated the early primaries, allowing him to amass an early delegate lead. Carter's polling numbers tumbled in March, and Kennedy won the New York and Connecticut primaries. [216] Though Carter developed a wide delegate lead, Kennedy stayed in the race after triumphing in Pennsylvania and Michigan. [217] By the day of the final primaries, Carter had registered the lowest approval ratings in the history of presidential polling, and Kennedy won just enough delegates to prevent Carter from clinching the nomination. [218]

After the final primaries, Carter met with Kennedy in the White House. Partly because Carter refused to accept a party platform calling for the establishment of a national health insurance program, Kennedy refused to concede. He instead called for an "open convention", in which delegates would be free to vote for the candidate of their choice regardless of the result in the primaries. [219] Carter's allies defeated Kennedy's maneuverings at the 1980 Democratic National Convention, and Carter and Vice President Mondale won re-nomination. [220] Despite Kennedy's defeat, he had mobilized the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, which would give Carter only weak support in the general election. [221]

The 1980 Republican presidential primaries quickly developed into a two-man contest between former Governor Ronald Reagan of California and former Congressman George H. W. Bush of Texas. Bush, who referred to Reagan's tax cut proposal as "voodoo economics", won the Iowa Caucus but faded later in the race. Reagan won the presidential nomination on the first ballot of the 1980 Republican National Convention and named Bush as his running mate. [222] Meanwhile, Republican Congressman John B. Anderson, who had previously sought the Republican presidential nomination, launched an independent campaign for president. [223] Polls taken in September, after the conclusion of the party conventions, showed a tied race between Reagan and Carter. [224] The Carter campaign felt confident that the country would reject the conservative viewpoints espoused by Reagan, and there were hopeful signs with regards to the economy and the Iranian hostage crisis. [225] Seeking to unite Democrats behind his re-election campaign, Carter decided to focus on attacking Reagan's supposed ideological extremism rather than on his own policies. [226]

A key strength for Reagan was his appeal to the rising conservative movement, as epitomized by activists like Paul Weyrich, Richard Viguerie, and Phyllis Schlafly. Though most conservative leaders espoused cutting taxes and budget deficits, many conservatives focused more closely on social issues like abortion and homosexuality. [227] Developments of the 1970s, including the Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade and the withdrawal of Bob Jones University's tax-exempt status, convinced many evangelical Protestants to become engaged in politics for the first time. Evangelical Protestants became an increasingly important voting bloc, and they generally supported Reagan in the 1980 campaign. [228] Reagan also won the backing of so-called "Reagan Democrats", who tended to be Northern, white, working-class voters who supported liberal economic programs but disliked policies such as affirmative action. [229] Though he advocated socially conservative view points, Reagan focused much of his campaign on attacks against Carter's foreign policy, including the SALT II treaty, the Torrijos–Carter Treaties, and the revocation of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. [230] Reagan called for increased defense spending, tax cuts, domestic spending cuts, and the dismantling of the Department of Education and the Department of Energy. [231]

Polling remained close throughout September and October, but Reagan's performance in the October 28 debate and Carter's failure to win the release of the Iranian hostages gave Reagan the momentum entering election day. [232] Reagan won 50.7 percent of the popular vote and 489 electoral votes, Carter won 41 percent of the popular vote and 49 electoral votes, and Anderson won 6.6 percent of the popular vote. [233] Reagan carried all but a handful of states, and performed especially well among Southern whites. [234] The size of Reagan's victory surprised many observers, who had expected a close race. Voter turnout reached its lowest point since the 1948 presidential election, a reflection of the negative attitudes many people held towards all three major candidates. [235] In the concurrent congressional elections, Republicans won control of the Senate for the first time since the 1950s. [234] Carter, meanwhile, was the first elected president to lose re-election since Herbert Hoover in 1932. [236]

Polls of historians and political scientists have generally ranked Carter as a below-average president. A 2018 poll of the American Political Science Association's Presidents and Executive Politics section ranked Carter as the 26th best president. [237] A 2017 C-Span poll of historians also ranked Carter as the 26th best president. [238] Some critics have compared Carter to Herbert Hoover, who was similarly a "hardworking but uninspiring technocrat." [239]

Jimmy Carter is much more highly regarded today than when he lost his bid for reelection in 1980. He has produced an exemplary post-presidency, and today there is an increased appreciation for the enormity of the task he took on in 1977, if not for the measures he took to deal with the crises that he faced. Carter took office just thirty months after a President had left the entire federal government in a shambles. He faced epic challenges—the energy crisis, Soviet aggression, Iran, and above all, a deep mistrust of leadership by his citizens. He was hard working and conscientious. But he often seemed like a player out of position, a man more suited to be secretary of energy than president. Carter became President by narrowly defeating an uninspiring, unelected chief executive heir to the worst presidential scandal in history. The nomination was his largely because in the decade before 1976, Democratic leadership in the nation had been decimated by scandal, Vietnam, and an assassination. [240]

Historian Burton I. Kaufman and Scott Kaufman write:

It was Carter's fate to attempt to navigate the nation between the rock of traditional Democratic constituencies and the hard place of an emerging conservative movement whose emphasis was more on social and cultural values than on the economic concerns of the Democratic Party. It was also Carter's misfortune that he led the nation at a time of staggering inflation and growing unemployment, compounded by an oil shock over which he had little control. At the same time, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Carter's was a mediocre presidency and that this was largely his own doing. He was smart rather than shrewd. He was not a careful political planner. He suffered from strategic myopia. He was long on good intentions but short on know-how. He had lofty ideals, such as in the area of human rights, which had symbolic and long-lasting importance, but they often blinded him to political realities. He was self-righteous. He was an administrator who micro-managed, but not well. Most important, he was a president who never adequately defined a mission for his government, a purpose for the country, and a way to get there. [241]


32.6: Primary Source: Jimmy Carter, “Crisis of Confidence” (1979)

On July 15, 1979, amid stagnant economic growth, high inflation, and an energy crisis, Jimmy Carter delivered a televised address to the American people. In it, Carter singled out a pervasive &ldquocrisis of confidence&rdquo preventing the American people from moving the country forward. A year later, Ronald Reagan would frame his optimistic political campaign in stark contrast to the tone of Carter&rsquos speech, which would be remembered, especially by critics, as the &ldquomalaise speech.&rdquo

&hellip Exactly three years ago, on July 15, 1976, I accepted the nomination of my party to run for president of the United States.

I promised you a president who is not isolated from the people, who feels your pain, and who shares your dreams and who draws his strength and his wisdom from you.

&hellip Ten days ago I had planned to speak to you again about a very important subject &mdash energy. For the fifth time I would have described the urgency of the problem and laid out a series of legislative recommendations to the Congress. But as I was preparing to speak, I began to ask myself the same question that I now know has been troubling many of you. Why have we not been able to get together as a nation to resolve our serious energy problem?

I know, of course, being president, that government actions and legislation can be very important. That&rsquos why I&rsquove worked hard to put my campaign promises into law &mdash and I have to admit, with just mixed success. But after listening to the American people I have been reminded again that all the legislation in the world can&rsquot fix what&rsquos wrong with America. So, I want to speak to you first tonight about a subject even more serious than energy or inflation. I want to talk to you right now about a fundamental threat to American democracy.

I do not mean our political and civil liberties. They will endure. And I do not refer to the outward strength of America, a nation that is at peace tonight everywhere in the world, with unmatched economic power and military might.

The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation.

The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America.

The confidence that we have always had as a people is not simply some romantic dream or a proverb in a dusty book that we read just on the Fourth of July.

It is the idea which founded our nation and has guided our development as a people. Confidence in the future has supported everything else &mdash public institutions and private enterprise, our own families, and the very Constitution of the United States. Confidence has defined our course and has served as a link between generations. We&rsquove always believed in something called progress. We&rsquove always had a faith that the days of our children would be better than our own.

Our people are losing that faith, not only in government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy. As a people we know our past and we are proud of it. Our progress has been part of the living history of America, even the world. We always believed that we were part of a great movement of humanity itself called democracy, involved in the search for freedom, and that belief has always strengthened us in our purpose. But just as we are losing our confidence in the future, we are also beginning to close the door on our past.

In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns. But we&rsquove discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning. We&rsquove learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose.

The symptoms of this crisis of the American spirit are all around us. For the first time in the history of our country a majority of our people believe that the next five years will be worse than the past five years. Two-thirds of our people do not even vote. The productivity of American workers is actually dropping, and the willingness of Americans to save for the future has fallen below that of all other people in the Western world.

As you know, there is a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions. This is not a message of happiness or reassurance, but it is the truth and it is a warning.

These changes did not happen overnight. They&rsquove come upon us gradually over the last generation, years that were filled with shocks and tragedy.

These wounds are still very deep. They have never been healed. Looking for a way out of this crisis, our people have turned to the Federal government and found it isolated from the mainstream of our nation&rsquos life. Washington, D.C., has become an island. The gap between our citizens and our government has never been so wide. The people are looking for honest answers, not easy answers clear leadership, not false claims and evasiveness and politics as usual.

What you see too often in Washington and elsewhere around the country is a system of government that seems incapable of action. You see a Congress twisted and pulled in every direction by hundreds of well-financed and powerful special interests. You see every extreme position defended to the last vote, almost to the last breath by one unyielding group or another. You often see a balanced and a fair approach that demands sacrifice, a little sacrifice from everyone, abandoned like an orphan without support and without friends.

Often you see paralysis and stagnation and drift. You don&rsquot like it, and neither do I. What can we do?

We are at a turning point in our history. There are two paths to choose. One is a path I&rsquove warned about tonight, the path that leads to fragmentation and self-interest. Down that road lies a mistaken idea of freedom, the right to grasp for ourselves some advantage over others. That path would be one of constant conflict between narrow interests ending in chaos and immobility. It is a certain route to failure.

All the traditions of our past, all the lessons of our heritage, all the promises of our future point to another path, the path of common purpose and the restoration of American values. That path leads to true freedom for our nation and ourselves. We can take the first steps down that path as we begin to solve our energy problem.


Watch the video: Jimmy Carter, Crisis of Confidence speech Longing for Meaning excerpt (August 2022).